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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
CLARENCE H. REDDING, TOM 
G. REDDING, and BERT W. 
REDDING, individually, 
Case No. 16935 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent Western Surety Company (hereinafter 
"Western Surety") seeks indemnity from Defendants-Appellants 
Clarence H. Redding, Tom G. Redding and Bert M. Redding (herein-
after "Reddings") for sums paid by it under a Motor Vehicle 
Dealer's Bond issued to Redding Associates, Inc. on the basis 
of indemnity agreements contained in Reddings' bond applications. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On June 7, 1978, Western Surety filed a Complaint in 
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County seeking 
judgment for $2,550.00 against Reddings based upon a claim it 
had paid to another automobile dealer as surety for Redding 
Associates, Inc. Since the facts were not disputed, and since 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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determination of the case turned upon interpretation of the 
provisions of the bond and the Motor Vehicle Dealers' Act, 
Chapter 3 of Title 41, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), 
the parties entered into a written stipulation of facts. Cross 
motions for summary judgment were heard on oral argument on 
November 23, 1979. There was no transcript of the hearing. 
The court ultimately entered an Order and Judgment in favor 
of Western Surety on January 25, 1980.* 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's order of 
January 25, 1980 granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment and denying Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Appellants further seek an order directing summary judgment in 
their favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Under Utah's Motor Vehicle Dealers' Act, UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 41-3-16(1) (1953, as amended) all automobile dealers must 
procure a surety bond as a condition of becoming licensed and 
doing business. In February, 1976, the Reddings made the 
appropriate applications, and a bond was issued by Western 
*The court had initially entered judgment for Western 
Surety on November 30, 1979. Reddings subsequently objected 
-to the content of the Judgment because it did not reflect a 
finding from the bench that they had neither engaged in fraud 
nor had fraudulent intent in the subject transaction and, 
further, that judgment was granted in favor of western Surety 
solely on the court's finding that Reddings had furnished an 
automobile purchaser with defective title contrary to the 
requirement of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-2 (1953) R. 62. The 
January 25, 1980 amended Order and Judgment incorporated 
those findings. (R. 64.) 
-2-
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Surety to Redding Associates, Inc., a Utah corporation, on 
February 17, 1976. Copies of the applications and bond are 
appended as Exhibits "A" and "B", respectively. 
In August, 1976, Redding Associates, Inc., doing business 
as Redding Auto Sales, purchased a 1972 CJ-5 Jeep bearing 
Alabama title, paying fair value for the vehicle. Thereafter, Auto 
Exchange, Inc., another automobile dealer, became interested 
in buying the jeep from Redding Auto Sales. On August 27, 1976, 
in contemplation of the purchase, Nick Smith, an employee of 
Auto Exchange, accompanied Clarence H. Redding to the Utah 
State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) office at 2100 South 
and State Streets in Salt Lake City. The certificate of title 
was presented to the clerk at the DMV, who examined it and 
informed both men that the title was in good order. (R. 34.) 
On that same day, Auto Exchange purchased the jeep from Redding 
Auto Sales and received the title. 
Auto Exchange then resold the jeep. Subsequent to that 
sale, it was discovered that the jeep was a stolen vehicle. The 
jeep, then located in California, was returned to the lien-
holder of the true owner. (R. 36.) 
Auto Exchange thereafter made written demand upon Western 
Surety to make good its loss under Redding Associates' Motor 
Vehicle Dealer's Bond. Western Surety, without making any demand 
upon Reddings, and without contacting or consulting them, paid 
Auto Exchange's claim for $2,500.00. On March 8, 1978, Western 
-3-
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Surety made demand upon Reddings to indemnify it, pursuant to 
the indemnity agreements in Reddings' bond applications, for 
the $2,550.00 paid to Auto Exchange. Reddings, believing that 
the claim was not covered by the surety bond and that they had 
a meritorious defense to Auto Exchange's claim, refused to 
indemnify Western Surety. On June 7, 1978, Western Surety 
filed the action resulting in this appeal. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the lower court erred in finding that the 
loss arose because Reddings violated UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-2 
(1953) by giving another automobile dealer defective title to 
a vehicle when they neither knew that the vehicle was stolen 
nor that title was defective. 
2. Whether the lower court erred by failing to find 
that Western Surety acted as a volunteer when it paid Auto 
Exchange, thereby relieving Reddings of any duty to indemnify 
it. 
3. Whether the lower court erred by failing to find that 
any obligation that may be owing to Western Surety by virtue 
of its payment to Auto Exchange is the debt of a bona fide 
corporation, for which Reddings are not individually liable. 
ARGUMENT 
(Preliminary Statement) 
This is not an action in which an injured purchaser seeks 
damages from a used car dealer from whom he bought a stolen 
-4-
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automobile. The purchaser here, another auto dealer, chose 
instead to assert its claim directly against Reddings' surety. 
As a result, this case involves a claim for indemnity arising 
from the relationship of principal and surety ~ a relationship 
mandated by statute for automobile dealers. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-16 (1953) requires that automobile 
dealers procure a bond as a condition of doing business. While 
dealers may be subject to broad liability in their transactions 
with purchasers, the surety's obligation on the bond is expressly 
limited by the Code. Stated simply, the question here is whether, 
on the facts of this case, Western Surety had any obligation 
under Reddings' bond to pay the claim of Auto Exchange, or 
whether in so doing it acted as a volunteer. 
POINT I 
REDDINGS' INNOCENT CONDUCT IN THE 
SALE OF THE STOLEN JEEP TO AUTO 
EXCHANGE IS NOT WITHIN THE AMBIT 
OF WESTERN SURETY'S OBLIGATION 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-18. 
A. Utah law specifically limits the rights of action 
against a surety for losses sustained in transactions with 
automobile dealers. The dealer's bond that Reddings obtained 
from Western Surety was the standard form of bond prescribed 
by UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-16(1) (1953). As mandated by that 
statute, the bond was "approved as to form by the attorney 
general of the State of Utah, and conditioned that said applicant 
-5-
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shall conduct his business as a dealer without fraud or 
fraudulent representation, and without the violation of any 
of the provisions of this act." 
The rights of action available against an automobile 
dealer's surety on the bond are set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 41-3-18, which provides: 
If any person shall suffer loss or damage by 
reason of fraud, fraudulent representation or 
violation of any of the provisions of this act 
by a licensed dealer or one of his salesmen 
... , such person shall have a right of action 
against such dealer, and/or the automobile 
salesman guilty of the fraud, fraudulent repre-
sentation or violation of any of the provisions 
of this act, and/or the sureties upon their 
respective bonds. 
It is clear from the language of § 41-3-18 that the 
legislature, in conjunction with its regulation of automobile 
dealers, intended to confer certain rights and remedies upon 
persons who conduct business with licensed dealers, including 
a direct right of action upon the dealer's bond. It is equally 
clear from the language of the statute that the legislature 
intended to limit the scope of protection under the dealer's 
bond to situations involving loss resulting from either the 
dealer's fraud or his violation of the statutory provisions 
regulating the conduct of his business.* 
These limitations on the statutory right of action were 
recognized by this court in Lawrence v. Ward, 5 U.2d 257, 300 
*The statute, of course, does not preclude other causes 
of action which an injured purchaser could assert against the 
dealer. 
-6-
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P.2d 619 (1956). After holding that the dealer's bond "was 
intended to protect all persons doing business with another 
in his capacity as a licensed motor vehicle dealer," the Court 
went on to examine the transactions in that case "to determine 
whether they fall within the purview of U.C.A. 1953, 41-3-18 . 
for which recovery could be had on the surety bond. 300 P.2d 
at 622. 
In the instant case, the lower court specifically found 
II 
that Reddings "engaged in no fraud or fraudulent intent in the 
specific transaction in question." (R. 64.) Therefore, in order 
to sustain the trial court's judgment, liability must be predicated 
upon some violation of the act resulting in a loss which Western 
Surety was obligated under the statute to pay. 
B. There is no strict liability under the Motor Vehicle 
Dealer's Act for innocent delivery of a defective certificate 
of title. The lower court granted summary judgment for Western 
Surety based solely on its finding that Reddings "supplied the 
purchaser of the automobile in question [with] a defective title 
contrary to the requirement of Utah Code Annotated, Cahpter 3 of 
Title 41 (1953, as amended)." (R. 64-65.) Although the written 
judgment refers only generally to violation of Chapter 3 of Title 41 
(R. 65), Western Surety argued below, and the court ruled from 
the bench, that the specific provision violated by Reddings was 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-2 (1953). That section provides: 
-7-
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Every person, firm, or corporation upon the 
sale and delivery of any used or secondhand motor 
vehicle shall within forty-eight hours thereof 
deliver to the vendee, and endorsed according 
to law, a certificate of title, issued for said 
vehicle by the state tax commission. 
It was Western Surety's contention that delivery of title under 
§ 41-3-2 "implies that this title should be good and sufficient by 
law on the vehicle " (R. 50.) In other words, according 
to Western Surety, delivery of defective title - even innocently -
is no delivery at all within the meaning of § 41-3-2. 
In determining whether Reddings' delivery of the defective 
title was a violation of § 41-3-2 and, if so, the type of violation 
for which a right of action exists against the surety under 
§ 41-3-18, the underlying purpose of Chapter 3 of Title 41 must 
be considered. The Motor Vehicle Dealer's Act is a regulatory 
statute designed to govern automobile dealers in the conduct of 
their business. It provides criminal sanctions for violation of 
its provisions (§ 41-3-2) and specifies conduct which will be 
deemed unlawful and a violation of the Act. The language of 
§ 41-3-23, enumerating prohibited acts and omissions, requires that 
a dealer act "knowingly" or "intentionally" or "unfairly" in many 
instances. The intent of the legislature in regulating auto-
mobile dealers was to protect the public from fraudulent acts 
* and intentional misconduct by sellers of new and used cars. 
* 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-1 (repealed 1967), which dealth with used 
cars brought into the state for resale, required that the dealer's 
bond cover losses occasioned by simple failure of title as well as 
fraud and breach of warranty. That provision was repealed in 1967. 
-8-
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The lower court apparently concluded that even innocent 
delivery of defective title violated § 41-3-2, requiring 48-hour 
delivery of the certificate, and that such violation conferred 
a right of action against Reddings' surety on the bond. Such 
interpretation not only fails to consider the goal of the act 
to prevent fraud and intentional misconduct by dealers, but 
also fails to account for the only provision of Chapter 3, 
Title 41 dealing with stolen vehicles. Under § 41-3-23(3), it 
is a violation of the act for a dealer 
[t]o knowingly purchase, sell, transport, dis-
mantle or otherwise acquire, dispose of or 
handle a stolen vehicle. [Emphasis added.] 
It is uncontroverted that Reddings had no knowledge at the time 
of the transaction that the jeep had been stolen. Without the 
requisite scienter, there could be no violation of § 41-3-23(3). 
To maintain that innocent handling of a stolen vehicle does not 
violate the act and does not confer a right of action under 
§ 41-3-18, but that innocent transfer of the certificate of title 
in the same transaction does violate the act and does confer 
such a right of action places an inharmonious and irreconcilable 
construction on the two provisions. In view of the express 
requirement that handling a stolen vehicle be "knowing" to 
constitute a violation, there can be no strict liability where 
the dealer has made a good faith effort to comply with § 41-3-2 
by delivering a title valid on its face and found to be in good 
order by the Department of Motor Vehicles. A finding of liability 
in this case would be equivalent to holding that a dealer and his 
surety are title insurers of automobiles, regardless of their know-
ledge on the conduct of the buyer. 
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C. Even if Reddings' delivery of the defective title 
was a violation of the act, Auto Exchange was precluded by its 
own conduct from maintaining an action under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 41-3-18. 
The right of action against a dealer or his surety 
provided by §41-3-18 is available only where the loss or 
damage is suffered by reason of the dealer's fraud or violation 
of the act. It is apparent from the facts of the subject 
transaction that the loss incurred by Auto Exchange resulted 
from its own conduct in accepting the certificate of title, 
and not as a result of any violation of § 41-3-2 that Reddings 
may innocently have committed. 
The facts show that an employee of Auto Exchange went 
to the Department of Motor Vehicles with Clarence Redding to 
ascertain the validity of the Alabama title. The clerk's 
representation that the title was in good order was made to 
both men. Based upon that representation, the sale of the jeep 
and delivery of the title to Auto Exchange was consummated on 
the same day. Both dealers had access to the same information 
and chose to conduct their transaction in reliance thereon. The 
loss which Auto Exchange later sustained was incurred through its 
own conduct; if there was any violation of the act by Reddings, 
Auto Exchange acquiesced in that violation and waived its right 
to claim damages as a result thereof. In Lawrence v. Ward, 
5 Utah 2d 257, 300 P.2d 619 {1956), this Court was presented 
-10-
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with a claim against a dealer's surety bond predicated upon 
violation of § 41-3-2 for failure of the dealer to deliver 
the certificate of title to the purchaser within forty-eight 
hours. The claimant bank had issued a check in the names of 
the dealer and the purchaser of an automobile in exchange for 
the purchaser's promissory note. It thereafter cashed the 
check bearing only the dealer's endorsement. When the dealer 
subsequently could not deliver the certificate of title, the 
purchaser refused to endorse the check, which had already 
been paid to the dealer. In rejecting the bank's claim for 
damages notwithstanding the dealer's complete failure to 
deliver the title, this Court said: 
It was obvious to the bank that the check was 
not properly endorsed and it had no right to 
rely on the expectation that the signature of 
the co-payee could be obtained at a later date. 
The loss of the bank occurred by reason of its 
own negligence and prior to the time when it 
was discovered that United Auto Sales could 
not deliver title, and it cannot now obtain 
judgment against the bond. 
300 P.2d at 622-623 (Emphasis added.) 
The same reasoning is equally applicable in this case. Auto 
Exchange could not have obtained a judgment against Reddings' 
surety bond since the loss occurred by reason of its own conduct 
and not in reliance upon the acts of Reddings. 
-11-
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POINT II 
WESTERN SURETY ACTED AS A 
VOLUNTEER WHEN IT HONORED THE 
CLAIM OF AUTO EXCHANGE; IN SO DOING, 
IT RELIEVED REDDINGS OF ANY 
DUTY TO INDEMNIFY IT. 
The applications for Redding Associates' surety bond 
provide that in consideration of Western's issuing the bond, 
the applicants "agree to indemnify • the said Company from 
and against any liability, and for all lost, cost, charges, 
suits, damages, counsel fees and expenses of whatever kind or 
nature which said company shall at any time sustain or incur, 
for or by reason, or in consequence of said company having 
become surety . . II (Emphasis added.) 
It is hornbook law that "[i]ndemnity against losses 
does not cover losses for which the indemnitee is not liable 
to a third person, and which he improperly pays." 41 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Indemnity §33. Western Surety voluntarily settled Auto 
Exchange's claim without making any demand upon Reddings and 
without contacting or consulting them. In so doing it covered 
a loss which was not within the scope of either party's obliga-
tions under UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-18 (1953). In Carson v. 
Geis Irrigation Co. of Kansas, Inc., 211 Kan. 406, 507 P.2d 295, 
(1973), the court said: 
While the fact of voluntary payment does not 
negative the right to indemnity; legal liability, 
i.e., proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
of the obligation to plaintiff or a third 
-12-
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party that cannot be legally resisted is a 
fundamental prerequisite to recovery by 
an indemnitee who has made a voluntary 
payment. [Citations omitted.] 
Id. at 300. 
Western Surety either failed to properly investigate the facts 
of the transaction or to understand the legal ramifications. 
In either event, by paying a claim which did not arise through 
either Reddings' fraud or violation of the Motor Vehicle Dealer's 
Act, it foreclosed defenses that could have been asserted against 
Auto Exchange. Because Western Surety acted as a volunteer on 
an obligation it legally could have resisted, it has no right to 
indemnity from Reddings on the claim. 
POINT III 
ANY OBLIGATION THAT MAY BE OWING 
TO WESTERN SURETY BY VIRTUE OF ITS 
PAYMENT TO AUTO EXCHANGE IS 
THE DEBT OF A BONA FIDE CORPORATION, 
FOR WHICH REDDINGS ARE NOT LIABLE. 
In their Answer to Western Surety's Complaint, Reddings 
denied that they had applied for the bond in their individual 
capacities or that they had any obligation to indemnify Western 
Surety thereunder. At oral argument on the motions for sununary 
judgment, counsel for the Reddings argued that any obligation 
owing to Western Surety in this matter was the corporate debt of 
Redding Associates, Inc. and not that of the individual defendants. 
However, the issue was not addressed by the lower court in its 
ruling. 
-13-
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Western Surety at all times was aware that it was dealing 
with a corporate entity and not with the Reddings as individuals. 
On each application for the surety bond, the box marked 
"Corpora ti on" was checked. In the space for the name of the obligee 
each application was marked "dba Redding Auto Sales, Inc." Al-
though the applications were executed by the Reddings without 
reference to their corporate capacity, there is no indication 
that the Reddings, in signing on behalf of the corporate applicant, 
intended to become personal guarantors of the corporation's 
indemnity agreement. And where there is doubt or uncertainty 
as to the intent of an indemnity agreement, it is the policy of 
this Court to construe the contract strictly against the party 
preparing it. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 
17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910, 914 (1965). Accord, Howe Rents 
Corp. v. Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 848 (1966). The 
applications and bond were standard Western Surety forms. 
The bond was applied for and issued on behalf of the 
corporation. It is clear that the Reddings as individuals cannot 
possibly be held liable for any obligation arising in connection 
with the corporation's surety bond. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and based upon the authorities 
cited herein, Appellants respectfully pray that the lower court's 
order granting summary judgment in favor of western Surety be 
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reversed, and that this Court direct that summary judgment be 
entered in their favor. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of June, 1980. 
ROBERT D. 
Attorneys 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing Brief of Appellants was HAND DELIVERED to David H. 
Epperson of Hanson, Russon, Hanson & Dunn, Attorneys for 
Respondent, 702 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
this 4th day of June, 1980. 
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